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This essay argues that the economic contribution of certain firms – be they small, young 
or rapidly growing – has to be understood in a broader context of creative destruction. 
Growth of some firms requires contraction and exit of some other firms to free up 
resources that can be reallocated to expanding firms. Entry and expansion are flip sides 
to exit and contraction and the process through which the factors of production are put 
into different use defines structural transformation. We analyze institutions and policies 
conducive to structural transformation, in particular the expansion of high-growth firms 
(HGFs), since they have empirically been shown to contribute disproportionately to 
economic development.  
Firm growth is viewed as resulting from the continuous discovery and use of 
productive knowledge. Rapid firm growth requires a set of economic actors with 
complementary competencies that work together to identify and commercialize novel 
business ideas. The institutional framework determines the incentives for these 
individuals to acquire and utilize knowledge. We identify a number of institutions that 
encourage the creation of HGFs and promote structural transformation. In particular, 
our analysis points to the key roles played by tax structures, labor market regulation, 
and the contestability of service markets. Even in advanced economies, there is a large 
untapped economic potential which can be unleashed by institutional changes, such as 
the opening up of closed markets for entrepreneurial competition. However, there is no 
“quick-fix” that will boost the frequency of HGFs and structural transformation. Our 
analysis suggests that policymakers need to adopt a broad approach and implement a 
wide array of complementary institutional reforms to increase the prevalence of HGFs 







For a long time, large firms were considered to create new employment and economic 
growth, mainly due to economies of scale in production as well as in research and 
development (e.g. Schumpeter, 1942; Gailbraith, 1956, 1967). This conventional 
wisdom was challenged by Birch (1979) who in an empirical investigation claimed 
small firms to be the main job generators. Birch’s results and his conclusions have been 
questioned and sparked up a debate; see Kirchhoff and Greene (1998) for a review of 
the discussion. Van Praag and Versloot (2008) summarize the empirical evidence on job 
creation by small firms, and conclude (p. 135) that it is an unambiguous result that small 
firms create more jobs on net than large firms, even when the methodology suggested 
by the critics is applied. Subsequent research shows that a fairly small number of high-
growth firms (HGFs for short)—on average smaller and younger than other firms—
contribute the bulk of net employment; see Henrekson and Johansson (2010) for a 
survey.  
This essay has its starting point in a generally overlooked part of the critique that 
certain firms; may they be small, young or rapidly growing, are of particular importance 
for job creation and economic growth. This critique asserts that growth has to be 
understood in a broader perspective entailing considerable churning and restructuring 
(e.g. Haltiwanger and Krizan, 1999).
1 In fact, rapid growth of some firms implies that 
they attract factors of production from other firms. Growth therefore requires 
contraction and exit of some firms to free up resources that can be reallocated to 
expanding firms. Entry and expansion are flip sides to exit and contraction. The process 
through which the factors of production are put into different use defines structural 
transformation.  
It may therefore be misleading to simply focus on a particular piece of this process 
and claim that it alone contributes a disproportionately large share towards net job 
growth. This is not to refute that some type of firms may be more productive than others 
in creating new jobs and contributing to economic growth, in the same way that some 
entrepreneurs are more successful than others. In fact, the critique is in concordance 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Bartelsman et al. (2004, 2005), Birch (2006), Brown et al. (2006), Caballero (2007), 
and Fogel et al. (2008) for empirical evidence that churning and growth are strong correlates. A suggested 
explanation is that churning accelerates the discovery procedure of new business opportunities and a rapid 




with Schumpeter’s (1942) description of capitalism as a process of creative destruction 
where novel ideas continuously challenge old structures, thereby giving rise to 
structural transformation when new successful innovations, products, firms and 
industries arise while obsolete ones decline and vanish. It is also in line with evidence 
from recent research showing that the employment effect of new firm entry tends to 
follow a “wave pattern”. Initially employment increases due to hiring by entering firms, 
composing the direct effect. Thereafter employment declines as a result of exits by both 
failed newcomers and crowding out of incumbent firms that have lower productivity 
levels than the successful newcomers. Finally, positive supply-side effects increase 
employment in the long run (Fritsch and Mueller, 2004; Fritsch and Noseleit, 2009). 
Accordingly, the conditions for structural transformation are decisive for economic 
growth. Empirical studies point out HGFs
2—or high-impact firms as Acs et al. (2008) 
and Acs (2010)) puts it—to be the main drivers of this process, which motivates in-
depth analyses of HGFs.  
Despite the heterogeneity across the studies in several dimensions, Henrekson and 
Johansson (2010) conclude that some general findings emerge:  
•  All studies report HGFs to be crucial for net job growth compared to non-
HGFs. They generate a large share of all, or more than all (in the case where 
employment shrinks in non-HGFs), new net jobs. This is particularly 
pronounced in recessions when HGFs continue to grow, while non-HGFs 
decline or exit. 
•  Several studies, particularly the ones concerning the U.S., find that HGFs 
provide a large share of new net jobs relative to total job growth in the 
economy and total unemployment.  
•  Small firms are overrepresented among HGFs, but HGFs are of all sizes. In 
particular, larger firms are important job contributors in absolute terms. A 
small sub-group of large HGFs—sometimes called Superstars or super 
Gazelles—are major job creators.  
                                                 
2 For early evidence see Birch and Medoff (1994) and Storey (1994). More recent studies include 




•  Age is of great importance. All studies reporting firm age conclude HGFs to 
be younger on average. Super Gazelles are also relatively young. HGFs are 
overrepresented in young and growing industries with a large inflow of new 
firms.  
•  Young and small HGFs grow organically to a larger extent than large and 
old HGFs, and therefore make a larger contribution to net employment 
growth. 
•  HGFs are present in all industries. There is no evidence that they are 
overrepresented in high-tech industries. If anything, HGFs appear to be 
overrepresented in service industries.  
 
On the basis of this meta-analysis, we conclude that HGFs are instrumental to 
economic growth and net job creation, in particular those HGFs that start growing 
rapidly when young and small. 
The purpose of this essay is to discuss institutions and policies conducive to the 
expansion of HGFs and therefore to structural transformation. We use North’s (1990, p. 
3) definition of institutions: ‘the rules of the game in society, or more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.’  
Institutions can be both formal—“hard”—(laws and regulations) and informal—
“soft”—(habits, norms, conventions etc.). Here we almost exclusively deal with formal 
institutions. This is not to deny that informal institutions such as networks, culture, 
codes of conduct, and trust are also very important. Although limiting the analysis to 
formal institutions is admittedly a simplification, it is of less concern than one would 
expect for a number of reasons, for instance, because informal institutions are harder 
both to enact and to analyze and since informal rules are not imposed through explicit 
political/collective decisions they cannot be directly influenced by policy.
3 
Obviously, the institutions we analyze in this chapter also affect the non-HGFs. 
However, we still believe that it is warranted to focus on the HGFs.  The reason is 
                                                 
3 Furthermore, a formal institution that is not enforced is likely to lose its practical relevance, and 
effective formal institutions become codified in society in the form of norms, habits and other informal 
institutions. In short, informal institutions are endogenous, i.e. the consequence of a certain set of policies 
and formal institutions—see, e.g. Lindbeck et al. (1999) and Kasper and Streit (1998)— and effective 




straightforward:  If certain institutions affect HGFs relatively strongly and if HGFs are 
of crucial importance, then the effect of institutions on HGFs is of particular relevance 
for growth. At first sight, this seems to contradict the story concerning the direct and 
indirect effects of new businesses formation on growth, since the development of HGFs 
represents only the direct effect. However, strong start-ups represent a rather serious 
challenge for the incumbents and thereby induce indirect effects (Fritsch and Noseleit, 
2009).  
We use Schumpeter’s (1934) theory of economic development as a starting point for 
the analysis (Section 2). Long-run growth results from the introduction and diffusion of 
profitable new combinations—novel ideas—into the economic system. Schumpeter 
emphasized this to be a human-driven process and recognized inventors, entrepreneurs, 
creditors and imitators to be key actors—each one performing a crucial economic 
function. We identify the constellation of actors with different but complementary 
competencies necessary to generate large-scale economic development and structural 
transformation.  
Thereafter, we integrate institutional theory into the analysis. Institutions, and in 
particular private property rights, shape the incentives of economic actors and the 
functioning of markets. Modern societies are rich webs of formal and informal 
institutions that differ greatly. A complete analysis of the effects of institutions on 
HGFs and structural transformation is therefore an immense task, which is beyond the 
scope of this essay. In three subsequent sections, we address three institutional systems 
identified as hampering HGFs and structural transformation. In what follows we will in 
turn deal with the effect on potential HGFs and structural transformation of institutions 
affecting freedom of enterprising—as in the right and opportunity for the different types 
of actors to establish enterprises producing goods and services with the objective to 
make a profit (Section 3), institutions governing the labor market (Section 4), and the 
tax system (Section 5). The essay ends with some concluding remarks (Section 6).  
 
2. The crucial agents and their competencies 
Wealth, measured as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, has developed 




industrial revolution broke this trend in development and since then wealth has surged 
(Figure 1).  
[Figure 1] 
 
In this essay, we deal with two main explanations that have been put forward to explain 
this historical shift: 
•  First, the accumulation and use of new productive knowledge including a far 
driven division and specialization of labor (Smith 1776); 
•  Second, the establishment and protection of private property rights (North 
and Thomas, 1973; Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986; Mokyr, 1990; Jones, 
2001; Acemoglu et al., 2005). 
Relating to the first point, Schumpeter (1934) asserts that producing the same goods in 
the same way results in a stagnant economy. Change is therefore a central concept for 
Schumpeter’s theory and the purpose of his seminal book is to present a theory of 
economic development explaining change—and economic growth—as an endogenous 
process.
4 Change emanates from the generation, introduction and dissemination of 
novel ideas on how to combine resources more efficiently.
5 Schumpeter distinguishes 
between novel ideas—inventions—and the introduction of these ideas into the 
economy—innovations. Economic development is defined as putting new combinations 
into use.
6 It is an endogenous process since it is driven by actors within the economic 
system. Schumpeter identifies four actors as critical according to the economic function 
they carry out: inventors who come up with novel ideas, entrepreneurs who introduce 
new combinations into the economic system, creditors who finance the enterprises of 
the entrepreneurs, and imitators who disseminate innovations through copying and 
commercializing them in competing firms. Hence, in order to achieve large-scale 
                                                 
4 Schumpeter (1934, p. 63): ‘It is just this occurrence of the “revolutionary” change that is our problem, 
the problem of economic development in a very narrow and formal sense. … By ”development”, 
therefore, we shall understand only such changes in economic life as are not forced upon it from without 
but arise by its own initiative from within.’  
5 Relating to Hayek (1937, 1945, 1978), this can be seen as the generation and use of new productive 
knowledge. 
6 Schumpeter (1934, p. 68): ‘The carrying out of new combinations means, therefore, simply the different 
employment of the economic system’s existing supplies of productive means – which might provide a 




industrial growth a set of actors with different but complementary competencies is 
required to generate, identify, select and exploit new combinations.
7  
We extend Schumpeter’s list and identify six key categories of actors:  
1)  Inventors fulfill the same function as in Schumpeter’s theory. They have 
detailed knowledge about products and solve specific problems of technical 
as well as of organizational and economic nature.  
2)  Entrepreneurs identify novel ideas about new combinations and introduce 
those with expected profitability into the market. They may be characterized 
as agents of change and fulfill a fundamental coordinating and judgmental 
function.
8 Compared to Schumpeter, the entrepreneur plays a more restricted 
role. Part of his/her function is carried out by the industrialists.  
3)  Industrialists are active after the entrepreneurial phase and organize the 
further commercialization of the innovation into large-scale businesses. They 
carry out the function of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur in later phases and 
the function of the Schumpeterian imitator. The reason for unraveling the 
entrepreneurial function is that there is empirical evidence that the 
introduction of new ideas into the economy and the subsequent development 
of the original innovations into large-scale businesses generally require two 
separate competencies (Flamholtz, 1986; Baumol, 2004). Like in 
Schumpeter’s theory, one individual can carry out more than one function 
and the original entrepreneur may evolve into an industrialist.  
4)  Financiers supply capital in the form of equity or loans. We recognize the 
empirical evidence establishing the importance of distinct categories of 
investors specializing in investing in different phases of the lifecycle of 
HGFs. We therefore prefer the term “financiers” before the term “creditors” 
to encompass these actors. In addition to capital, financiers provide 
management skills, industry-specific knowledge and access to business 
networks necessary for rapid firm growth. Venture capitalists supply 
                                                 
7 See Johansson (2010) and Eliasson and Eliasson (1996) for a further discussion. The idea of the 
importance of complementary competencies to generate growth is recognized by a number of research 
scholars. See, for instance, Phelps (2007, p. 553) for a discussion in conformity with our analysis.  
8 A profitable venture for the individual entrepreneur may, however, have a zero (unproductive 




enterprises in early phases of business ventures with capital and actors in the 
secondary markets carry out similar functions, but at a later stage when 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists want to exit from their investments. 
There are several types of actors in secondary markets, notably portfolio 
investors in publicly listed companies, private equity (PE) firms, and 
management buy-ins. Research also identifies business angels as providing a 
similar role as venture capitalist, but in an earlier phase.
9  
5)  Skilled labor. Economic development and economic growth requires labor 
with relevant professional skills. The lack of individuals with specific skills 
may become a bottleneck for further expansion of HGFs and dampen 
structural transformation.  
6)  Competent customers provide the entrepreneur with information about their 
preferences. The ability to discern the preferences of the customers, so that 
highly-valued goods and services are produced, is a key ingredient in 
successful entrepreneurship; see von Hippel (2007) and Bhidé (2008) for 
recent examples. Competent customers should be representative of large 
groups of customers and can be both firms and individuals. Large enterprises 
can also function as competent financiers and finance the development of 
particular products, as exemplified by the biotechnology industry (e.g. 
Lerner and Merges, 1998; Audretsch and Feldman, 2003).  
The actors start firms to exploit business ideas, and innovations are commercialized in 
both new and established firms. If the actors are successful their firms expand, but if 
they fail to generate sustainable profits their firms exit. Figure 2 schematically 
summarizes the role of the various actors in the process of fostering HGFs. The figure 
provides a stylized representation of the categories of actors needed in the various 
growth phases of HGFs (the development of a business idea, introduction, early growth, 
and rapid growth into a large-scale firm). Some categories may be important in several 
phases and a certain individual can fulfill several functions either simultaneously or at 
different points in the individual’s or firm’s life cycle. In a stylized form, the 
                                                                                                                                               
entrepreneurs perform entrepreneurial activities where the social outcome is positive and based on wealth 
generation (Baumol, 1990). 
9 See Wright (2007) for an overview of the different categories and Prowse (1998) for an analysis of the 
function of the private equity market. Gompers and Lerner (2001) offer a comprehensive analysis of the 




development of rapidly growing firms may be depicted as an S-shaped curve. Most 
HGFs do not display sustained growth, but follow a more complex pattern (Parker et al., 
2010). The figure shows at which stage of a firm’s growth different categories play a 
key role. The order in which the categories appear beneath the boxes indicates which 
actor that has the main coordinating responsibility.  
This is not a definite ranking and in practice it differs across enterprises, but a 
stylized depiction of what we believe is the typical situation. In the first phase, 
entrepreneurs together with competent customers identify potential business 
opportunities. Inventors are engaged to solve specific problems. The first phase of 
commercialization (introduction and early growth of firms) involves entrepreneurs, 
while skilled workers are involved to a small extent only. Industrialists are active in the 
phase of industrialization and rapid growth, which also requires a great deal of skilled 
labor. Venture capitalists are important financiers in the earlier phases. In later phases 
when the firm is larger, this role is taken over by actors in secondary markets. 
Competent customers are typically involved in all phases and ultimately (together with 




The economic activities of the actors give rise to a dynamic process of creative 
destruction—channeled via firm entry, expansion, contraction and exit—which brings 
about structural transformation in the perennial struggle between new and old 
structures. In what follows we focus on the effects of institutions on the establishment, 
growth and exit of HGFs. We aim to answer the question how should institutions be 
designed to promote HGFs?  
Our approach relates to the literature on “technological regimes” pioneered by 
Winter (1984). In particular, a distinction has been made between ‘entrepreneurial’ and 
‘routinized’ regimes (Audretsch, 1995). An entrepreneurial regime is found to apply in 
early stages of a product or industry life cycle, where knowledge is new and dispersed, 
development is driven by product innovation, firm entry and entrepreneurship, while 
scale economies are of minor importance. By contrast, a routinized regime applies to 
later stages of an industry or a product life cycle, when products and knowledge have 




center stage, and large incumbent firms tend to predominate. The entrepreneurial regime 
relates to the early phases of the process of creative destruction when novel ideas are 
introduced and new technologies are discovered. The routinized regime relates to the 
later phases when the technologies are exploited. In the later phase the industry has 
probably undergone a period of shake-out and is dominated by a small number of firms 
(cf. Klepper and Simons, 2005).  
Audretsch and Fritsch (2002), Fritsch (2004) and Fritsch and Mueller (2006) have 
extended the use of the regimes concept to geographical units, notably regions. The idea 
being that the mode of production in a certain region may be distinct from the dominant 
modes of production in other regions. This suggests that regional growth may be 
spurred by different kinds of economic policies depending on the knowledge conditions 
underlying the industries represented in different regions.  
Linking to our analysis, regional regime is not a choice variable; it can rather be 
seen as the outcome of a historical process of structural transformation and is therefore 
strongly path dependent. This is all the more clear since the formal institutional setup is 
for the most part national rather than regional, and yet there could exist large regional 
differences in technological regimes.
10 Hence, the concept of regional growth regimes 
provides a good ex post characterization of how the production system has evolved in a 
particular region. We believe that our approach complements the concept of growth 
regimes and provides a useful a tool for policy guidance, since it focuses on the 
interaction and complementarity of different categories of key actors necessary to build 
a HGF and their incentives.  
 
3. Freedom of enterprising and/or the regulation of product markets 
Since HGFs are prime movers of structural transformation, we begin by discussing the 
effect of free enterprising restrictions on the prevalence of HGFs. With free enterprising 
we mean the right to establish profit seeking firms producing goods and services. This 
gives consumers the option to buy preferred quantities and qualities at offered prices 
from different suppliers. In recent decades, developed countries have experienced a 
wave of deregulations aimed at increasing the contestability of markets and providing 
                                                 
10 Two famous examples are the difference between Route 128 in Boston and Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 




more opportunities for private entrepreneurship, e.g. in telecommunications, 
transportation and financial services. This can be expected to lead to greater scope for 
the emergence of HGFs.  
However, one central segment of many advanced economies remains heavily 
regulated and in some cases even monopolized by the public sector: The provision of 
private-good social services such as health care, care of children and the elderly, and 
education. The social benefits from further deregulations fostering HGFs in these areas 
are likely to be substantial (although the difficulties arising from asymmetric 
information and moral hazard are no doubt often greater here than in other areas). These 
industries already constitute a considerable share of GDP: About 20 percent of GDP in 
the OECD, and even more (about 30 percent) in the Scandinavian welfare states 
(Adema, 2001; Adema and Ladaique, 2005; Andersen, 2008). These industries will 
meet an increasing demand from aging and wealthier populations. The income elasticity 
of services provided by these industries has been estimated to be as high as 1.6 (Fogel, 
1999). While several of these markets have been partially opened for private 
competition in recent years, many impediments are still in place, with private firms still 
producing only a fraction of total output. We discuss three combinations of restrictions 
separately: (i) the case where both production and financing are monopolized by 
government, i.e. government controls production and prices and pays for the services; 
(ii) the case where production is monopolized by government, but private financing is 
allowed; and (iii) the case where private production is allowed but financing comes 
from the government.  
 
3.1 Public production and public financing 
Private entrepreneurs cannot play any role if the provision of goods and services is 
monopolized by government. Business angels, venture capitalists and actors in the 
secondary market will not be present, since there are no investment opportunities. The 
build-up of industrial competence is negligible when the acquisition and use of such 
competence is restricted. While research and development may be subsidized, the 
incentives for inventors themselves are weakened since there will be no competitive 
markets for potentially successful inventions. The labor market is monopsonized, i.e. 




scarcity of skilled workers.
11 Competent customers will be scant and unable to affect 
production. 
This will hamper structural transformation, since the essence of entrepreneurial, 
industrial, business angels, venture capital and secondary market actor functions is to 
generate profit through the use of new productive knowledge commercialized in 
competitive markets. These competencies are acquired through individual learning-by-
doing in profit-driven firms and can rarely be substituted by competence obtained in 
political organizations (Pelikan, 1993).
12 As a result, HGFs will not form, dampening 
structural transformation. Today, there are very few markets in democratic societies 
where government monopolizes both production and financing with one notable 
exception: higher education. 
 
3.2 Public production and private financing 
There are a few markets, mainly infrastructure, where government monopolizes 
production, but where private financing is allowed, even as the main source of funding. 
Electricity supply, garbage collection, telecommunications, postal services, public 
transportation and water supply are still prime examples in many countries. Here too, 
we observe an ongoing deregulation. To exemplify: Personal transports on railway were 
until recently monopolized in most European countries. Now a partial deregulation has 
taken place opening up the market for private and international providers in many EU 
countries.  
Revoking the restriction on private financing while keeping production under 
government control does not change the effect on HGFs and structural transformation 
compared to the case of government monopolization of both product and financing 
markets. In this setting critical entrepreneurial competence can hardly exist. Public 
enterprises sometimes have intrapreneurs, e.g. hospital managers, school principals or 
college deans that improve performance through innovation and the build-up of 
structural capital. But in this system establishments that are better managed or otherwise 
                                                 
11 See, e.g. Hibbs and Locking (2000) 
12 In this context, private firms can be seen as “universities” for educating talented people (cf. Eliasson 
and Vikersjö, 1999). In line with this way of reasoning, small firms may function as a cost-efficient 
mechanism to identify, select and develop entrepreneurial, industrial and venture capital competencies. 
Failures are less costly and learning costs lower in small firms because small values are at stake (Lucas, 




above average in performance have weak incentives and far less opportunities to expand 
and improve quality across the board. Business angel and venture capitalist 
competencies still cannot exist, and industrialist competencies are hard to acquire, 
attract and utilize. State ownership makes management less interested in innovation 
activities, since it is more difficult for them to reap any benefits from these activities 
compared to private owners (e.g. Shleifer, 1998).
13 This implies that it is difficult for 
inventors to earn returns on their efforts in excess of their salary, which in general is 
much less than the market value of potentially successful inventions.
14 The 
monopsonized labor market will also make the salaries lower than in a market with 
many competing producers, leading to poor incentives to acquire high skills.  
 
3.3 Private production and public financing 
Welfare states increasingly recognize that ensuring access to health care and other social 
goods and services does not require government production of such goods, only public 
financing. Hence, market-type mechanisms
15 that combine private provision and public 
financing of these services are increasingly utilized. Outsourcing, vouchers and public-
private partnerships are the three most common arrangements. Deregulating markets 
previously closed to private entrepreneurship through these strategies increases the 
economy’s potential to generate HGFs. But the remaining regulation may still cause 
problems for future HGFs. First, the government is a monopsonist. Consumers are 
entitled to specific goods or services at reduced costs or free of charge, but only from 
providers commissioned by government.
16 The providers typically have limited options 
                                                 
13 Hart et al. (1997, p. 1131) argue that the focus on quality changes from innovative activities differ from 
traditional approaches in the literature on regulation and procurement, e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1993), who 
study issues like adverse selection and moral hazard stemming from incomplete information in 
contracting. 
14 This should be separated from the rate of innovation for inputs purchased by the government from 
private firms, such as pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. Winston (1998) provides empirical 
examples of how the transfer of ownership from the government to private actors positively affects the 
creation and adoption of new technologies. 
15 OECD (2005, p. 130) defines a market-type mechanism as ‘encompassing all arrangements where at 
least one significant characteristic of markets is present.’ 
16 One reason could be that the government wants to ascertain that service providers offer a minimum 
level of quality, for instance, concerning health care. Shleifer (1998) suggests that in the case where 
monitoring costs are high and private firms have incentives to shirk on quality, a government-managed 
organization may even have some advantages over private alternatives. These alternative mechanisms can 
mitigate the problems associated with the removal of market forces, but are unlikely to fully offset the 
costs, especially since the market can be combined with alternative ways of influencing producers (Le 




to offer and charge for additional quality on top of what is granted through the tax-
financed system. These restrictions bar customers from buying their preferred qualities 
or services in preferred quantities from preferred providers. The growth of potential 
HGFs may then slow down—or even stop altogether—due to restrictions on attracting 
customers. As a result, reallocation and structural transformation will be dampened.  
Second, it is common that government crowds out private producers in markets like 
health care and non-mandatory schooling. A common strategy is to offer services free of 
charge, financed through taxes in combination with the banning of customers from 
being eligible for any subsidies when buying from private suppliers. Such policies may 
imply a de facto ban on private entrepreneurship in these markets, even though not 
explicitly prohibited by law. This does not suggest that health care and other welfare 
services should not be publicly financed, rather it implies that the fostering of HGFs and 
structural transformation are encouraged by a policy where private producers are 
entitled to the subsidies if the patients or customers prefer a private producer to a public 
producer, i.e. the subsidy should follow the patient/customer, like in a voucher system. 
In many instances opening previously monopolized markets to private providers has led 
to impressive performance of HGFs suggesting that there is a large untapped potential 
for this in sectors such as health care, education and care of children and the elderly. 
One such example is the voucher system for school choice that was introduced in 
Sweden in the early 1990s, which paved the way for several HGFs in the area. At about 
the same time local and regional governments began to outsource health care, and from 
this a number of HGFs have emerged. Some of them have since become 
multinationals.
17 
Sometimes it is suggested that private firms providing publicly financed services 
should be prohibited from making profit and required to reinvest all surplus in the 
firm.
18 Such provision constitutes no impediment for private non-profit foundations 
(such as universities and many U.S. hospitals). However, a de facto ban on profit will 
have the same effect on HGFs and structural transformation as the government 
monopolizing production. Even though there will exist a strong demand for, for 
                                                 
17 One of the most well-known examples is the health care provider Capio, which was founded in Sweden 
in 1994. In 2008 Capio had 16,500 employees in eight countries. There are also several large operators in 
elderly care, which are gradually becoming multinational as well. 




example, private schools, this will weaken profit incentives for entrepreneurs and 
reduce business opportunities for venture capitalists. Consequently, there will be no 
HGFs and structural transformation will be slow.  
A major disadvantage of prohibiting private financing is the lack of signaling from 
spending decisions by competent customers, since all private customers are excluded. 
The mixture of private production and public financing is therefore expected to prevent 
the formation of complete sets of actors with the requisite complementary 
competencies; and lacking private customers, few HGFs are expected.
19 Table 1 
provides a summary of the analysis. The benchmark case is private production and 
private financing, when there are no legal restrictions barring the formation of sets of 
actors possessing all required competencies, rapidly growing firms and fast structural 
transformation. The analysis reveals that thriving HGFs require free private provision of 
goods and services and private financing. Only then can the incentives be (reasonably) 
harmonized for all required key actors, thereby providing favorable circumstances for 
HGFs. 
 
[Table 1]  
 
4. The organization of labor markets, the prevalence of HGFs and structural 
  transformation 
Rapid firm growth and structural transformation presupposes the reallocation of labor 
from low-productivity to high-productivity firms and industries. Labor studies 
document massive ongoing restructuring of jobs and workers across firms (Abowd and 
Kramarz, 1999; Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999; Caballero, 2007). It is reasonable to 
hypothesize that current and future HGFs are more in need of flexibility and freedom of 
contracting in order to reach their potential high-growth. Institutions hampering the 
freedom of contracting curtail the possible combinations of factors of production. The 
large productivity differentials across firms in the same industry indicate that labor 
productivity controlling for skills/competencies can vary dramatically depending on 
who is the manager/entrepreneur (Lucas, 1978; Pelikan, 1993; Caballero, 2007).  
                                                 
19 An exception is when the government purchases goods and services for their core activities, such as 




In this section we will examine the impact of labor market institutions on the 
functioning and efficiency of key competencies. We focus on three labor market 
institutions of particular importance for the economy’s ability to generate HGFs and to 
promote structural transformation: (i) Wage-setting institutions; (ii) employment 
protection legislation; and (iii) the social insurance system. 
 
4.1 Wage-setting institutions 
Wage-setting institutions may impact the scope for cooperation between key actors with 
complementary competencies, and the conditions for (potential) HGFs and structural 
transformation through several channels. In particular, the wage compression associated 
with centralized wage bargaining is likely to disadvantage potential HGFs, since an 
artificially compressed wage structure in both tails of the distribution makes it more 
difficult for profitable firms with high productivity to use salaries as an incentive to 
recruit new productive employees, making expansion more difficult to realize. This 
effect is reinforced if taxes are progressive. Minimum wages set above the market 
equilibrium level, on the other hand, forces low-profit firms with low productivity out 
of business. Start-ups generally tend to be low-wage firms in the beginning due to their 
relatively low productivity before they reach the minimum efficient scale of the industry 
(Audretsch, 2002). A study by Halabisky et al. (2006), demonstrates HGFs to be low-
salary companies in the beginning of their life cycle and large firms in slowly growing 
industries to be high-salary companies. When young potential HGFs realize their 
growth potential and begin to grow rapidly, salaries start to grow fast. They conclude 
(Halabisky et al., 2006, p. 265): ‘In other words, for small firms, wage levels were 
highest in those that grew the fastest.’ The finding suggests that a compressed wage 
structure pegging minimum wages above the market equilibrium level tends to choke 
potential HGFs in their infancy. They cannot bear high wage costs in the beginning of 
their life cycle when still developing their product and in the early phase of 
commercialization before the firm has become more productive and could afford to pay 
higher salaries.  
Empirical studies find HGFs to be younger and smaller than other firms on average 
and most likely to be in the services sector. Wages are consistently higher at larger 




other job attributes (Oi and Idson, 1999). Old firms pay higher wages than new firms on 
average and industries in the low-end of the wage distribution are found in services, not 
in manufacturing.
20 Hence, the negative effect of wage compression is reinforced by the 
fact that wage compression disadvantages firms that are most likely infant HGFs.  
Also, centralized wage-setting institutions disadvantage potential HGFs by 
implementing standard rate compensation policies that closely tie wages to easily 
observable job and worker characteristics such as occupation, education, experience and 
seniority.
21 In their study of the size-wage structure in the U.S. manufacturing sector, 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) find that residual wage dispersion declines sharply with 
establishment size in standard human capital regressions that relate worker earnings to 
sex, education, experience, and job tenure.  
Given the large intra-firm differences in productivity and productivity growth, in 
particular in young and rapidly expanding industries and young firms (Caballero, 2007), 
it follows that the functioning of the cooperation of different key actors needed for 
HGFs is impaired if wages are set in negotiations far from the individual workplace, and 
therefore not taking these facts into proper account.  
 
4.2 Employment protection legislation 
There are large cross-country differences concerning employment protection legislation 
(EPL) (Skedinger, 2010). There is a risk that rigid labor market legislation locks in 
employees in current firms and industries, which is at odds with the needs of rapidly 
growing firms. For instance, strict application of the principle of ‘last in—first out’ in 
case of redundancies implies that tenure at the current employer becomes relatively 
more important for labor security than individual skill and productivity. This fact 
increases an employee’s opportunity cost of changing employers or of leaving a secure 
salaried job. There may be room for making exceptions from the ’last in – first out’ rule. 
Often this requires union consent, and exceptions are therefore granted through 
negotiations between the employer and the union, not by the employer. Irrespective of 
                                                 
20 Garen (1985) and Kremer (1993) develop theoretical models that explain the systematic sorting of more 
productive workers to larger employers as an efficiency-enhancing outcome in economies with 
heterogeneous, imperfectly substitutable labor. 
21 Freeman (1988), Blanchflower and Freeman (1992) and Blau and Kahn (1996) provide evidence that 
unions and other centralized wage-setting institutions compress wages among observationally similar 




skill, an employee can never be sure of the outcome of such negotiations. Hence, there 
will always be an opportunity cost, also for high-skill workers, to give up a long-tenured 
position for a new job. This will make it more difficult for rapidly expanding firms to 
hire skilled workers. The risk of growth dampening bottle-necks in production 
increases.  
The empirical findings about churning and restructuring give reasons to believe that 
in particular strict employment security provisions and other regulations that restrict 
contracting flexibility are more harmful for enterprises that would like to grow rapidly. 
As an employer learns about a worker’s abilities over time, or as those abilities evolve 
with experience on the job, the optimal assignment of the worker to various tasks is 
likely to change. The scope for task reassignment within the firm can be expected to rise 
with firm size. In an unfettered labor market, optimal task reassignment often involves 
mobility between firms, and such mobility is higher when the initial employment 
relationship involves a small, often young, business. For instance, Schnabel et al. (2008) 
report that employment stability (measured as time employed in the same firm) is higher 
and the risk for becoming unemployed lower in incumbent firms than in newly founded 
firms. Moreover, both the rate at which workers separate from jobs and the rate at which 
employers destroy job positions decline with the size, age and capital intensity of the 
employer (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). Bartelsman et al. 
(2004, p. 4) claim that there is much more churning among young and small firms 
compared to old and large ones. In a meta-analysis of employment creation studies, van 
Praag and Versloot (2007, p. 360) conclude that ‘employment dynamics are larger in 
entrepreneurial firms’.
22 These patterns in worker separation and job destruction rates 
suggest that any costs imposed by EPL are likely to fall more heavily on younger, 
smaller and less capital-intensive (often service) employers. Since HGFs are 
overrepresented in these categories, this implies that a stringent EPL disproportionately 
burden HGFs. Another important argument is provided by the “varieties of capitalism” 
literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001), where it is argued that employment protection 
legislation harms particularly innovative firms and start-ups because these firms are 
faced with an exceptional degree of uncertainty and have a special need for flexibility.  
                                                 




If regular employment is highly regulated there may be strong incentives to devise 
arrangements that circumvent these regulations. In several European countries new 
forms of flexibility have emerged, leading to more job opportunities (Blau and Kahn, 
1999; Skedinger, 2010). The most important of these arrangements are increased self-
employment, the emergence of an underground economy where the government refrains 
from enforcing regulations, and increased reliance on temporary employment.
23 It is 
likely that part of the increase in self-employment in recent years is driven by such 
considerations. For the self-employed, compensation and working hours are totally 
unregulated and no labor security is mandated. Also, very small firms may be able to 
avoid unionization and the signing of collective agreements, and therefore benefit from 
greater freedom of contracting. This room of maneuver is likely to be lost once the firm 
size exceeds a certain threshold. Therefore, these evasive measures do little to help 
HGFs and welfare-enhancing structural transformation. Instead, they tend to create a 
system with a large share of economic activity occurring in small firms without the 
ability or the aspiration to become HGFs.
24  
The differential effect of labor market regulations may go a long way towards 
explaining why the rate of self-employment is fairly low in the U.S., while it is very 
high in Italy. One may hypothesize that in the U.S. the really good entrepreneurial firms 
are more likely to grow rapidly, while the onerous regulation, possibly in combination 
with the high tax rates on labor income, makes it difficult and risky to build large firms 
in Italy. Instead, the firms tend to remain small and resort to a strategy of cooperation 
with other small firms in clusters (Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999). 
 
4.3 The social insurance system 
The design of the social insurance system also affects the conditions for HGFs and 
structural transformation. One argument in favor of a relatively generous insurance 
system is that it enhances structural transformation. It is plausible that a rapid structural 
transformation is correlated with a high turnover of jobs making people temporarily 
unemployed. A well functioning insurance system will then provide income security 
                                                 
23 Arai and Heyman (2004) report that temporary job flows in Sweden in the 1990s were as much as ten 
times higher than job flows for permanent contracts. See also Shane (2008). 
24 These opposing effects are also consistent with the findings of Robson (2003) and Torrini (2005), who 
do not find any relationship between the rate of self-employment and the degree of regulation of labor 




during periods of unemployment making people more supportive of fast transformation. 
A counterargument is that too generous a social insurance system may in practice work 
as a source of income substituting for paid employment. In this case, the social 
insurance system increases the reservation wage which is likely to hamper structural 
transformation.  
The design of the social insurance system may also affect individuals’ incentives to 
establish and expand firms. Sinn (1996) argues that by providing insurance for 
unfavorable outcomes, an extensive and generous public social insurance system can in 
principle encourage individuals to pursue entrepreneurial endeavors. This is a valid 
theoretical argument but it is an open question whether it is important empirically. At 
first sight it appears more clear-cut that a generous welfare system makes it less costly 
to bear uncertainty as an entrepreneur or transfer to a risky job in an entrepreneurial 
firm. In labor markets where job security is closely linked to job tenure, this may no 
longer hold; what matters is the opportunity cost, i.e. how much an employee has to 
give up in terms of income security if (s)he transfers to self-employment or a risky job 
in an entrepreneurial firm.  
We can illustrate this point by comparing the situation in Sweden and Denmark. In 
Denmark, generous welfare systems are combined with weak job security mandates, 
sometimes called “flexicurity” (Andersen, 2005). In Sweden, the situation is very 
different. If employment with the current employer has lasted for a long time, and the 
employer is unlikely to be forced to shut down, the system in reality provides income 
security for the individual.
25 By contrast, somebody who voluntarily gives up a tenured 
position for self-employment may often end up having no more security than what is 
provided by social welfare, and this presupposes that the individual depletes all her own 
assets. Hence, the construction of the public income insurance systems in combination 
with the EPL tends to penalize individuals who assume entrepreneurial risk. As a result, 
the opportunity cost of giving up a tenured position in Denmark is substantially lower 
than in Sweden.  
A final point concerns the design of the supplementary pension system and other 
important benefits that may be tied to employment, notably health insurance. 




elements of redistribution and risk-sharing across individuals in a group, e.g. the white-
collar workers in a certain industry. The pension benefit level may be disproportionately 
tied to the wage level achieved at the end of the professional career. To the extent that 
this is true, the mobility of (older) workers across firms is greatly discouraged, as well 
as the hiring of elderly unemployed.  
 
5. The tax code, the prevalence of HGFs and structural transformation 
The tax system is particularly important for the issue discussed here. Taxes invariably 
influence transactions in that they create a wedge between the net receipt of sellers and 
gross costs of buyers of a service or a product. Hence, taxes greatly influence the 
incentives to acquire and apply productive knowledge as well as the possibility to 
reallocate factors of production to more productive areas. Taxes can create lock-in 
effects of labor and capital. In Section 2 we identified six distinct categories of actors 
crucial for HGFs. However, the tax code only imperfectly acknowledges these 
categories; there is no specific tax on income from entrepreneurial effort or inventive 
activity. Instead, based on provisions in the tax code, individual income will be 
classified as labor income, capital income and/or corporate income, and within each of 
these categories there may be further provisions influencing the effective tax rate. In 
what follows we will examine how the incentives for the different categories of key 
actors are affected by the tax system.  
 
5.1 Labor taxation and sales tax/VAT 
The level and progressivity of labor taxation (including mandatory social security 
contributions) affect employees directly, by determining the incentives for work effort, 
labor supply (on the extensive and intensive margin), occupational choice, career 
aspirations, and the propensity to upgrade and learn new skills. Most obviously, high 
and progressive labor taxes lower the rate of return on productive skills, and therefore 
they are likely to reduce the supply of skilled workers.
26 They also slow down 
                                                                                                                                               
25 This was true until 2006, but beginning in 2007 the Swedish government has implemented numerous 
measures that reduce the generosity and eligibility of the social insurance system for the unemployed. 
26 The incentives to acquire human capital through formal schooling may be strong thanks to low or zero 
tuition fees, subsidized student loans and housing financed by taxes, while high marginal taxes abate the 




restructuring and the reallocation of people across firms, since it becomes more costly to 
obtain the net wage differential necessary to induce a person to quit their current 
employment position.  
To the extent that inventors are taxed as wage-earners their incentives are also 
affected by the tax code for labor income. The same is true for industrialists (those who 
carry out the function of the Schumpeterian imitator and the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur in later phases of commercialization of the original innovation), unless 
they have a large ownership share in the firm they manage, which is usually not the case 
for large firms.  
The level and progressivity of labor income taxation also indirectly affect the 
industry structure from the demand side. High rates of personal taxation tend to make it 
more profitable to shift a large share of service production to the informal economy, in 
particular into the ‘do-it-yourself’ sector.
27 Cross-country comparisons of industry-level 
employment also point to considerable scope for substitution of certain economic 
activities between the market and non-market sectors (Rogerson, 2006; Freeman and 
Schettkat, 2005).  
As a result, the emergence of a large, efficient service sector competing successfully 
with unpaid work is less likely in countries with high rates of personal taxation. 
Consequently, important opportunities for commercial exploitation and entrepreneurial 
business development become less accessible. When services are provided by 
professionals, incentives emerge to invest in new knowledge, to develop more effective 
tools, to develop superior contractual arrangements, to create more flexible 
organizational structures and so forth. Put simply, higher rates of personal taxation 
discourage the market provision of goods and services that substitute closely for home-
produced services.
28  
The incidence of commodity taxation generally falls on final domestic consumers, 
while intermediate goods and exports are exempted. Hence, the effects of these taxes on 
the different actors are similar to the effects of labor taxation although there is no 
                                                 
27 This basic insight constitutes an important point of departure in recent work in the theory of optimal 
taxation. The theoretical results of Kleven et al. (2000) and Piggott and Whalley (2001) strongly suggest 
that the optimal tax structure involves a relatively low tax rate on those market-produced services that 
could alternatively be produced in the household sector. See also Jansson (2006). 
28 See Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008), Rogerson (2006) and Davis and Henrekson (2005) for 




progressivity. Generally, there is considerable differentiation in sales/VAT taxation 
across countries and commodity groups.  
 
5.2 Taxation of stock options  
One mechanism to encourage and reward individuals supplying key competencies to a 
firm is the use of stock options. In ideal circumstances this can provide incentives that 
closely mimic direct ownership. This is likely to be most important for employed 
inventors, entrepreneurs and industrialists in certain industries where options are an 
effective response to agency problems. 
The efficiency of stock options is highly dependent on the tax code. If gains on 
stock options are taxed as wage income when the stock options are tied to employment 
in the firm some of the incentive effect is lost. This is particularly true if the gains are 
subject to (uncapped) social security contributions and if the marginal tax rate is high. 
The situation is very different if an employee who accepts stock options can defer 
the tax liability to the time when the stocks received upon exercise of the options are 
eventually sold. The effectiveness is further reinforced if there are no tax consequences 
to the employee upon the granting or the exercise of the option and if the employee is 
taxed at a low capital gains rate when the stock acquired through the exercise of the 
option is sold. In the latter case the tax risk of the options is pushed back to the 
government. This accomplishes two things: It increases the potential profit from the 
stock options and it allows budget-constrained individuals to sell stocks whenever they 
choose to do so. It is noteworthy that the U.S. changed the tax code in the early 1980s 
along the latter lines, which paved the way for a wave of entrepreneurial ventures in 
Silicon Valley and elsewhere (Misher, 1984; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). 
 
5.3 Taxation of venture capital and private equity activity 
Venture capitalists often fill a crucial role in the development of a small entrepreneurial 
high-growth venture by converting high-risk opportunities to a more acceptable risk 
level through portfolio diversification, and adding key competencies that the firm may 
be lacking. This is achieved by means of developing arrangements that align the 
incentives of the three actors—investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurial start-




also largely governed by the tax code for stock options, capital gains, and whether 
pension funds are allowed to invest in high-risk securities issued by small or new 
companies and venture capital funds.  
The tax systems of many countries evolved before complicated ownership structures 
involving VC/PE financing even existed.
29 Sophisticated mechanisms were needed to 
provide high-powered incentives for a number of actors in addition to the final equity 
holders. In fact, the modern VC industry in the U.S. could not evolve until the tax 
system was changed in key respects: Sharp reductions in the capital gains tax, new 
legislation in 1979 allowing pension funds to invest in high-risk securities issued by 
small or new companies and venture capital funds, and stock option legislation of 1981 
that made it possible to defer the tax liability to the time when the stocks were sold 
rather than when the options were exercised (Fenn et al., 1995).  
In the U.S. investments by venture capital firms are taxed at low rates. The returns 
that venture capitalists receive when the companies they help build are sold (so-called 
carried interest) are taxed at the 15 per cent capital gains rate. For the founders of the 
startup the capital gains tax rate may be half of that level (up to a high cap), since half of 
the gains is tax exempt if the stock has been held for at least five years.  
In Sweden, by contrast, domestically domiciled VC and PE firms are at a 
disadvantage relative to other firms. Until 2003 dividends were taxed threefold: At a 
rate of 28 per cent in both the firm itself and the VC firm and, when applicable, at 30 
per cent at the owners’ level. Since 2003 there is no taxation at the level of the VC or 
PE firm. And, business angels that take active part in the management of the firms in 
which they invest are taxed at a higher rate. Likewise, the income of the general 
partners in VC firms and income from and stock options tied to employment are taxed 
as wage income. Thus, the high rates of taxation of entrepreneurs, general partners of 
VC firms and the owners of the VC firms or the business angels result in a substantial 
reduction in the after-tax return on activities typical of VC firms in the U.S. This may 
                                                 
29 VC and PE ownership involves several layers of ownership: Private ownership stake by founders and 
key personnel, ownership share by VC/PE firm, ownership stake by VC/PE partners (often indirect), 




be an important factor explaining the fact that few Swedish firms founded in recent 
decades have grown to a large size.
30  
 
5.4 Corporate taxation 
Following extensive tax reforms, corporate tax rates throughout the OECD countries 
have come down from very high levels in the 1980s. Cross-country variations in the 
statutory corporate tax rates, however, remained large until recently. For instance, in the 
early 2000s it exceeded 50 percent in Germany (by 2009 the German corporate rate had 
been lowered to roughly 16 percent) while it was no higher than 24 percent in Ireland 
and 18 percent in Hungary (2003). In general, there was a discrepancy between 
statutory and effective corporate income tax rates stemming from mechanisms such as 
tax-reducing depreciation rules, inventory valuation rules, and other more ad hoc tax 
reductions that may be country or industry specific.
31 Seen from the perspective of the 
individual firm, opportunities for lowering the effective tax rate induce behavioral 
responses by firms, and to the extent that these opportunities differ depending on firm 
and industry characteristics, effects on HGFs and on structural transformation can be 
expected. 
 
5.5 Taxation of current capital income 
Current capital income consists of interest income and dividends on equity holdings. 
Tax systems may differ in important respects here: (i) Labor income and capital income 
can either be summed and taxed according to the same tax schedule, and if the income 
tax is progressive this may result in very high taxes on capital income, in particular if 
the tax rate applies to nominal as opposed to real returns; (ii) capital income can be 
taxed separately from labor income, either at a flat or progressive rate with or without 
inflation adjustment; (iii) dividends may be taxed at a lower rate reflecting the fact that 
dividends as opposed to interest payments is a tax-deductible business cost for the firm; 
(iv) the tax code may put restrictions on the payment of dividends to the owners of 
closely held firms in order to prevent active owners from converting labor income into 
                                                 
30 In 2004, among the 100 largest firms in Sweden, including firms formed by government and firms 
established by foreigners, there were 34 firms originally founded by Swedish entrepreneurs. The median 
year of establishment of these firms was 1908 and no one was founded after 1970 (Axelsson, 2006).  




capital income taxed at a lower rate.
32 Moreover, tax systems may differ as to whether 
deduction of interest payments is allowed (in real or nominal terms).  
Hence, the tax code pertaining to current capital income has large incentive effects, 
especially for entrepreneurs and the functioning of secondary markets. In particular, if 
taxation is nominal and tax rates are high, the real rate of taxation — i.e., the combined 
effect of nominal taxation and inflation on the real rate of return on an investment—can 
easily exceed 100 per cent even at moderate inflation rates. On the other hand, this may 
be largely offset by tax deductibility of interest payments, and if certain investments are 
tax favored opportunities for tax arbitrage arise.
33  
 
5.6 Taxation of capital gains 
Most of the economic return from the successful building of an HGF comes in the form 
of a steeply increased market value of its stock rather than as dividends or large interest 
payments to the owners. As a result, the taxation of capital gains on stock holdings has 
large effects on the incentives to create wealth through the fostering of HGFs.  
There are large differences across countries and over time. In some countries the tax 
rate is zero or very low on capital gains on long-term holdings of equity, thereby 
providing strong incentives for entrepreneurs to create value by investing money and 
effort in their own business, and to give other key actors (industrialists and business 
angels) ownership stakes in the firm if their competencies are required. In other 
countries the reverse may be true, that is, the tax system penalizes owners of stock in 
closely held firms relative to owners of stock in listed firms in order to prevent owners 
of profitable small businesses from saving on taxes relative to the case where they are 
regular employees.
34  
                                                 
32 In this respect it is noteworthy that in the U.S. dividends in the so-called S-corporations are only taxed 
at the level of the owner’s personal income tax (Cullen and Gordon, 2006). 
33 Fukao and Hanazaki (1987) provide systematic evidence of such effects for OECD countries in the 
1970s and 1980s. 
34 This is the case in Sweden, where the legislator is concerned that owners of closely held firms do not 
convert labor income to capital income by paying themselves dividends taxed at 30 percent rather than 
wages taxed at the marginal tax rate for labor income. The scope for dividend payments is therefore 
restricted to a relatively small percentage of the equity capital paid in by owners. Similar provisions raise 
the capital gains tax on small businesses (Agell et al., 1998). In recent years it has normally been 43 
percent for small closely held firms instead of the regular 30 percent, since half of the capital gain has 




Moreover, the capital gains tax may differ across different types of owners, where 
some types of owners, such as institutional investors and offshore trust funds, are taxed 
at lower rates than individuals. This is likely to spur an endogenous response in the 
ownership structure of the business sector towards the tax-favored owner categories. 
Generally, if individual stock holdings are disfavored relative to institutional holdings 
this affects the functioning of secondary markets, giving more effective control rights to 
fund managers and less to final owners. In case owner competence is a scarce resource 
and ownership matters for potential HGFs, such tax rules tend to inhibit the emergence 
and growth of HGFs (cf. Pelikan, 1993). Empirical results demonstrate that the success 
of HGFs often is due to individual owners “of flesh and blood” playing a decisive role 
in critical phases of the life cycles of HGFs. These individuals have often generated 
their wealth through their own entrepreneurial activities when younger, and then 
become business angels or venture capitalists. Institutional holdings are managed by 
employees with other backgrounds lacking the experience and competence of these 
individual owners, which probably can only be acquired through learning-by-doing as 
entrepreneurs and private investors. Arguably, this competence is among the most 
valuable competencies in a market economy. An individual possessing this competence 
will therefore not work as an employee in general, but in his/her private company to 
fully reap the return on the competence.  
 
5.7 Taxation of asset holdings 
There are several types of taxes levied on asset holdings where the tax is decoupled 
from the return. This is true for taxes on wealth, property and inheritance. In cases 
where these taxes are non-zero, the rules for how taxable wealth is assessed in the 
business sector are particularly important in our context. Successful entrepreneurs, 
venture capitalists and actors in secondary markets have been shown to be highly 
sensitive to these kinds of taxes.
35 In some systems corporate wealth may be exempted, 
which would spur investment in entrepreneurial ventures by key actors. Alternatively, 
corporate wealth may be taxed heavily, while other assets such as pension savings or art 




relative return on asset accumulation. In most cases where such taxes are levied the 
calculations are complicated; certain assets may be exempted and the imputed value 
used as the basis for assessments may be far below the market value. Again, HGFs tend 
to depend on individual owners during certain critical phases in their life cycle, and 
taxes on asset holding that give incentives for individual owners to shun direct 
ownership of unlisted stock is expected to affect HGFs negatively.  
 
5.8 Taxation at the ownership level 
To get a better understanding of the effect of the tax system on the prevalence of HGFs 
and the speed of structural transformation the combined effect of different taxes on the 
incentives to establish firms with high-growth ambitions have to be taken into account, 
including differences caused because of different sources of finance. For our purposes it 
is important to highlight whether there are any differences between small individually 
owned firms (incorporated or unincorporated) and institutionally owned firms, which 
are either listed or unlisted.  
Estimating, in real terms, the size of the marginal tax burden faced by private firms 
for investment in real capital is a painstaking task requiring that we consider the overall 
effects of several different taxes, such as corporate taxation with its specific rules for 
depreciation and valuation, as well as the taxation of interest income, dividends, capital 
gains, and wealth. In addition, we need to consider how these tax schedules differ across 
different types of investors. A correct estimate of the tax burden must take into 
consideration which type of real capital the firms invest in, how these investments are 
financed, who the firm’s owners and creditors are, and in what industries the 
investments are made. Estimates have been made for a number of countries using the 
methodology developed by King and Fullerton (1984). 
We will use the Swedish tax system to illustrate how tax schedules affect HGFs. 
Table 2 presents effective marginal tax rates for different combinations of owners and 
sources of finance for Sweden in 1980 and 1994. Three categories of owners and 
sources of finance are identified, and the effective marginal tax rate is calculated 
                                                                                                                                               
35 See Rosen (2005) for an overview. In Sweden the emigration of successful entrepreneurs was 
extensive due to very high effective taxes on wealth and inheritance, particularly during the 1970s and the 




assuming a real pre-tax rate of return of 10 percent. A negative number means that the 
real rate of return is greater after tax than before tax. 
The table highlights several aspects of the tax system that are potentially important 
determinants of HGF activity. First, in 1980 debt financing received the most favorable 
tax treatment and new share issues the least favorable treatment. Second, the taxation of 
households as owners was much higher than for other categories. In fact, more than 100 
percent of the real rate of return was taxed away for a household buying a newly issued 
share. Third, tax-exempt institutions benefited from a large tax advantage relative to the 
other two categories of owners. Tax-exempt institutions had a substantial relative tax 
advantage throughout when investing in newly issued shares.
36 Fourth, insurance 
companies were in an intermediate position in terms of effective taxation. As shown by 
Davis and Henrekson (1997) the tax system favored large and old manufacturing firms. 
By implication a tax system of this type penalized many of the key attributes 
characterizing HGFs. Distortions of such magnitudes most certainly had a negative 
effect on the way the actors with different but complementary competencies can 
cooperate, thereby harming the capability of generating rapidly growing firms, in 
particular entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, actors in secondary markets and HGFs in 




A series of tax reforms in Sweden from 1985 until 1994 entailed a substantial ‘leveling 
of the playing field’ for different types of owners and sources of finance. The tax 
changes of 1993–94, primarily the abolishment of wealth tax on unlisted stocks and on 
dividends at the investor level, and the lowering of capital gains taxation to 12.5 per 
cent, brought about a dramatic leveling of taxation for different owners and different 
means of finance compared to the situation in 1980. Taxation on financing by owner 
equity, regardless of whether it takes the form of a new issue of shares or of earnings 
plowed back into the firm, became largely the same for households as for other 
                                                 
36 Tax-exempt institutions by definition pay no tax on interest receipts, dividends or capital gains. This 
category includes charities, scientific and cultural foundations, foundations for employee recreation set up 






37 This should have a positive effect on the generation and 
growth of HGF and on structural transformation.  
 
5.9 Symmetry in the tax treatment of business profits and losses 
It has been argued that governments can provide insurance for business owners by 
taking part of profits in good times and offsetting losses in bad times (Domar and 
Musgrave, 1944; Sinn, 1996). If individuals are risk averse, such insurance encourages 
the risk-taking central to all entrepreneurial activity.  
A number of arguments have been put forward to counter this proposition. For 
instance, it is not valid under progressive taxation and, under most tax codes, that losses 
be offset against future profits only. It could well be that misdirected forms of insurance 
only serve to encourage new business ventures among those who are not Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs (de Meza, 2002).  
In this respect there are also large differences across countries. For instance, Cullen 
and Gordon (2006) show that the asymmetry in the tax treatment of business profits and 
losses is greater in Sweden than in the USA
38 In the USA, the asymmetry actually runs 
the other way in some cases. Cullen and Gordon (2006, p. 17) write: ‘For individuals in 
the top bracket, risk taking in start-up firms is heavily subsidized in the U.S., but tax 
penalized in Sweden.’ This is due to the fact that in the United States business losses 
can in certain cases be offset against tax reductions based on the progressive labor tax 
schedule.  
The usual tax asymmetry discourages risk-taking activities even for risk-neutral 
owners. Since startup activities are often risky, this effect is stronger for new firms than 
for incumbents. This difference is aggravated to the extent that small firms have more 
volatile profit streams and fewer opportunities to apply losses in some units to reduce 
taxes on the gains accruing to other units. For closely held firms, the disincentive to 
pursue risky activities is even stronger insofar as risk-averse owners have much of their 
wealth tied up in the firm. As regards the previously reported evidence that HGFs tend 
                                                 
37 These rules were only in place for one year, and the differential across owner categories and sources of 
finance increased again in 1995 when taxation of dividends at the investor level was reintroduced and the 
capital gains tax was raised to 30 percent. 
38 Asymmetry refers to a situation whereby the effective tax rate on business profits is greater than the 




to be young, it is conceivable that such a policy has negative effects on entrepreneurial 
activities in general and HGFs in particular.  
 
5.10 Taxation of savings 
Given the level of wealth or national savings, the composition of national savings is not 
neutral in its impact on entrepreneurship and small business development. The manner 
in which savings are channeled to various investment activities influences the type of 
business organization that can obtain credit. Pension funds, for example, are both 
relatively risk averse and have difficulties handling smaller individual investments. 
Therefore, they are less likely to channel funds to entrepreneurs than business angels or 
venture capital firms. Hence, if the government forces individuals to carry out large part 
of their savings through a national pension fund system, small business credit 
availability will suffer relative to an alternative policy and institutional arrangements 
that allow for greater choice by individuals regarding their savings and investments. But 
apart from such forced measures the tax system may provide forceful incentives 
regarding the level and channeling of savings. 
A tax system that encourages reliance on savings schemes that escape capital 
taxation typically restricts the final owner’s control of the assets. In doing so, the tax 
treatment of financial assets and property encourages the accumulation of illiquid assets 
controlled by large financial institutions rather than assets under the direct control of the 
final owner. A typical case is pension assets that cannot be withdrawn until a person 
reaches the retirement age. Personal financial assets with these characteristics cannot be 
used by the asset holder as working capital neither in an existing owner-operated 
business nor to start a new owner-operated business. In particular, this would affect 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and, hence, the generation and early growth of 
HGFs.  
If entrepreneurial talent and venture capital competence are unevenly distributed, 
policies that decrease the likelihood of equity constraints for the entrepreneurially 
talented and those with talent for being venture capitalists are likely to be beneficial 
policies. The only efficient means of increasing this likelihood is to pursue economic 








6. Concluding discussion 
We argue that analyses of firm growth in general, and the economic contribution of 
HGFs in particular, benefit from being evaluated in a broader context of structural 
transformation. Rapid growth of some firms on one hand requires entry of new firms 
from which to “recruit” high-growth candidates and on the other hand the contraction 
and exit of other firms to free up resources for expanding firms. The essence of 
structural transformation is the reallocation of means of production from certain uses to 
more productive ones. This way, the economy transforms into new structures: it 
changes form. Without this dynamic reallocation, the growth of firms would be held 
back, irrespective of their inherent growth potential. Empirical studies demonstrating 
HGFs to be of particular importance for driving structural transformation motivates that 
particular attention is paid to them.  
The successful commercialization of innovations—new productive knowledge—by 
HGFs depends on actors with complementary competencies that work together. The 
high degree of complexity in production combined with the specifics of human capital 
makes successful interaction among actors with different key competencies and roles 
difficult but also highly rewarding when successful. Most (potential) HGFs fail, but the 
few that succeed account for a substantial part of growth and development in their 
industries.  
Bringing together the specialized, non-transferable competencies of different actors 
into a well-functioning whole is invariably difficult, even with favorable institutions and 
public policies, and almost impossible in any other setting. Favorable economic 
institutions are likely to be of particular importance for the emergence of HGFs, both 
because of the sensitiveness of competencies to the design of institutions and because of 
the high social return in terms of growth and job creation.  
Our analysis emphasizes the complementary character of institutions.
40 There is no 
“quick-fix” that will boost the frequency of HGFs. If policymakers would like to 
                                                 




improve conditions for HGFs, our analysis suggests that they need to adopt a broad 
approach and implement a wide array of complementary institutional reforms. Hence, 
creating appropriate conditions for growth based on effective constellations of key 
actors with complementary competencies places great demands on government policies. 
As is pointed out by many research scholars, picking winners in this chaotic world is 
virtually impossible and the only winning strategy is ‘to let 1000 flowers bloom’ (Birch 
2006, p. 198). The perpetual search by economic actors for profits that exceed the risk-
adjusted rate of return available for passive investors leads to a situation in which 
entrepreneurship, talent and ownership skills are channeled to the most promising areas 
and supplied in the best possible quantities. This increases the probability that new 
business opportunities will be developed and exploited to their full potential. This 
process creates the organizational and structural capital that is an indispensable 
component in all successful enterprises. The potential entrepreneur can always refrain 
from developing and using his/her skills and remain an employee with a fixed salary; 
the venture capitalist can choose to remain passive instead of supplementing his/her 
financial investment by supplying management skills, and so on.  
Our analysis is confined to highly developed countries with basic institutions, such 
as secure property rights and the rule of law, in place. We have identified three bundles 
of institutions which are likely to be particularly important for the prevalence of HGFs 
and for rapid structural transformation: Labor market regulations, the tax system and the 
degree of free enterprising (the right for private entrepreneurs to establish and provide 
goods and services with a profit). 
Labor market regulations can be expected to influence incentives for potential HGFs 
and existing HGFs, by restricting the freedom of contracting and thereby curtailing the 
possible combinations of factors of production. The need for experimentation in order to 
find more efficient factor combinations is likely to be larger in new firms and industries 
in general, and in current and potential HGFs in particular.  
The most important channel by which labor market institutions affect HGFs is by 
hampering the supply of skilled workers to firms undergoing expansion and/or change. 
                                                                                                                                               
40 The same conclusion is made by researchers in different fields of economic research. For instance, 
Orszag and Snower’s (1998) study of the complementarity of different policies in the area of 
unemployment provides an interesting parallel, showing how the effectiveness of one policy depends on 




Given the large worker flows required in a dynamic economy, it will be harder to recruit 
workers with the competencies needed: The opportunity cost of leaving a tenured 
position goes up for the employees, the fixed cost of hiring goes up when a bad 
recruitment becomes more costly to reverse; there may be threshold effects that make 
firms hesitant to expand beyond a certain size, and a great deal of entrepreneurial effort 
may need to be expended on evasive rather than directly productive activities.  
A fundamental insight from our analysis is that experimentation and selection not 
only takes place across firms, but also between workers and other key actors (notably 
entrepreneurs) whose productivity is only revealed while working. If temporary 
contracts are used systematically in order to circumvent regulations tied to permanent 
employment, industries and business ideas that depend on high-skilled labor and on-the-
job learning are disadvantaged. Legal and institutional hurdles that prevent firms from 
laying off workers that underperform, discourage potential HGFs from expanding. 
Depending on how labor markets are regulated and how these regulations interact with 
the social insurance system, the opportunity cost of becoming self-employed is affected. 
When social security benefits are closely tied to tenured positions and the employee has 
tenure at a low-risk employer the opportunity cost increases heavily. If employees who 
establish their own business loose part of their social security entitlements, this can be 
expected to impact negatively on the recruitment of entrepreneurs.  
The analysis reveals that tax systems typically contain many asymmetries giving 
rise to distortions concerning, for instance, ownership and firm age, which is expected 
to have a negative effect on the way actors with different but complementary 
competencies can cooperate, and hence on the ability to generate HGFs. Despite recent 
trends towards tax harmonization within the EU and the OECD, it is clear that there 
exist innumerable combinations of tax rates and tax provisions giving rise to different 
blends of ownership structure, financing structure, industry structure, size distribution of 
firms and employment dynamics across countries.  
Even seemingly neutral taxation may give rise to distortions if, for instance, some 
actors and firms are more likely to be financially constrained, notably small firms.
41 
Such examples are corporate taxation, taxation on savings and taxation on private 
wealth where small and young firms to a larger extent rely on retained earnings and 
                                                 




private equity. In our view, this is an important determinant of cross-country differences 
in the prevalence of HGFs. Likewise, the regulatory (tax) burden is likely to fall more 
heavily on small and young firms (and hence on potential HGFs), since the concomitant 
administrative costs have a large fixed component that is unrelated to the size of the 
firm.
42  
Of the three categories of institutions we have discussed, monopolization of 
production poses the greatest obstacle for the creation and joint functioning of actors 
with complementary competencies which are instrumental in the generation of HGFs. 
While high taxes and labor market regulations also impinge on the creation of critical 
competencies and the actions of key actors embodying these competencies, there is 
often some scope for (costly) tax evasion and circumvention of labor market 
regulations. Government monopolization of production considerably constrains the 
evolution of contestable markets, where critical entrepreneurial and venture capitalist 
competencies can be developed and acquired through learning. De facto prohibition of 
profit-driven organizations has the same effect. Consequently, there will be no HGFs. 
Moreover, the more complicated and the less stable regulations, the more they 
benefit large incumbent firms, i.e. firms with a low probability of becoming HGFs. 
Generally, we find distortions introduced by the three bundles of institutions analyzed to 
disfavor the kind of firms that have been found to be overrepresented among HGFs, 
namely young, small and service sector firms. The policies may also enforce each other.  
To summarize the effects of the institutions on HGFs we characterize institutions 
that provide a favorable environment for “dynamic capitalism”, the experimental 
process of creative destruction facilitating the joint functioning of agents with different 




Even in advanced economies, there is a large untapped economic potential which can be 
unleashed by institutional changes, such as the opening up of closed markets for 
entrepreneurial competition. This can be expected to have a positive effect on the 
emergence of the requisite specialized actors and the prevalence of HGFs. The effect 
would be more pronounced if tax structures and labor market institutions 
                                                 




simultaneously were adjusted in order to stimulate the emergence of more effective 
cooperation of the different types of actors, and institutions were made more neutral 
with respect to firm attributes, type of ownership and source of finance. The two most 
important conclusions from this analysis are that (i) institutions have far-reaching 
effects, and (ii) to identify these effects on HGFs, the respective institutions have to be 
studied in depth. The Devil is in the details!  
It is appropriate to end with a word of caution and point out that the relationship 
between institutions, entrepreneurship and other productive competencies, and growth is 
currently only partly understood. Much more research in this respect is called for to gain 
a fuller understanding both qualitatively—which are the key institutions and how do 
they interact with one another—and quantitatively. To be able to quantify the effect of 
changes in a specific institution such as a key tax rate or labor security mandates, 
empirical research requires heterogeneity of institutions like in cross-country 
comparison or instances of “clean” changes in a particular institution. Here, a great deal 
can be learnt from labor economics, where considerable knowledge has been gained 
from the study of quasi experiments, often using instrumental variable techniques; see 
Angrist and Krueger (2001). There are many possible instances that could be utilized. 
Let us just mention two: (i) the different strategies by universities vis-à-vis the 
involvement of their faculty in the commercialization of research (Siegel et al. 2003); 
(ii) the lessening of the employee protection legislation in Sweden in 2001 for firms 
with fewer than 10 employees (Lindbeck et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, institutions do not come out of thin air; they emerge and develop in a 
specific context.
43 In propitious circumstances informal and formal institutions evolve 
in ways that encourage economic growth by facilitating the entrepreneurial exploitation 
of economically valuable knowledge. However, this is by no means guaranteed. History 
is replete with examples where the evolution of institutions supporting dynamic 
capitalism has been severely hampered and even totally blocked.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
economic development, in particular for young and small firms (see, e.g. European Commission, 2007). 
43 The literature trying to explain institutional change or the lack thereof is currently expanding fairly 
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Figure 1 Gross Domestic Product per capita for all history of mankind 
 
 
Source: De Long/Kremer data from −1000000 to 1985 (extension of Maddison’s estimates; Kremer 
1993), Maddison data from 1985 to 2005 (GDP per capita, 1990 International Dollars; Maddison 2009), 
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Table 1  Regulations, the prevalence of HGFs and structural transformation.  
  Private production  Monopolized production 
Private financing 
Entrepreneurs – Yes  
Inventors – Yes 
Industrialists – Yes 
Skilled labor – Yes 
Business angels – Yes 
Venture capitalists – Yes 
Actors in secondary markets – Yes 
Competent customers – Yes 
 
All actors present, prevalence of HGFs and 
fast structural transformation 
Entrepreneurs – No 
Inventors– Limited 
Industrialists – No 
Skilled labor – Limited 
Business angels – No 
Venture capitalists – No 
Actors in secondary markets – No 
Competent customers – Limited 
 
Several key competencies missing, 
imperfectly replaced by government, 




Entrepreneurs – Possible 
Inventors – Possible 
Industrialists – Possible 
Skilled labor – Yes 
Business angels – Possible 
Venture capitalists – Possible 
Actors in secondary markets – Possible 
Competent customers – Limited 
 
Potential impediments to presence of all 
actors, HGFs and to structural 
transformation, depending on institutional 
climate  
Entrepreneurs – No  
Inventors–Limited 
Industrialists– No 
Skilled labor – Limited 
Business angels – No 
Venture capitalists – No 
Actors in secondary markets – No 
Competent customers – No 
 
Most key competencies missing, 
imperfectly replaced by government, 






Table 2  Effective marginal tax rates for different combinations of owners and sources 
of finance in Sweden, 1980 and 1994 (real pre-tax rate of return = 10%). 
 




1980       
Households  58.2  136.6  51.9 
Tax exempt institutions  –83.4  –11.6  11.2 
Insurance companies  –54.9  38.4  28.7 
       
1994       
Households  32.0/27.0†  28.3/18.3†  36.5/26.5† 
Tax exempt institutions  –14.9  21.8  21.8 
Insurance companies  0.7  32.3  33.8 
Note: †Excluding wealth tax, the wealth tax on unlisted shares was abolished in 1992. All calculations are 
based on the actual asset composition in manufacturing. The following inflation rates were used: 1980: 
9.4%, 1994: 3%. The calculations conform to the general framework developed by King and Fullerton 
(1984). The average holding period is assumed to be 10 years. A negative tax rate implies that the rate of 
return after tax is greater than before tax. For instance, a tax rate of –83 percent for a debt-financed 
investment owned by a tax-exempt institution in 1980 tells us that a real rate of return of 10 percent 
before tax becomes 18.34 (10 − (−8.34)) percent after tax, while a real rate of return of 10 percent before 
tax for a debt-financed investment owned by a household becomes 4.18 (10 − 5.82) after tax. 
Source: Södersten (1984), and calculations provided directly by Jan Södersten.
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Table 3  Institutions favoring dynamic capitalism, the emergence of HGFs and 
structural transformation. 
 
Institution   
Marginal tax rate  Low 
Personal tax on capital income  Low 
Personal tax on capital gains  Low 
Tax on stock options  Low 
Degree of tax neutrality across 
owner categories 
Neutrality 
Degree of neutrality across 
sources of finance 
Neutrality 
Personal taxation of asset 
holdings 
No, or exemption for equity holdings 
Corporate tax rate  Low statutory rate, low effective rate, 
neutral across types of firms and industries 
Symmetric tax treatment of 
profit and losses 
Yes 
Labor security mandates   Portability of tenure rights 
Design of pension plans   Fully actuarial 
Wage-setting arrangements  Decentralized and individualized 
Production of welfare 
services/merit goods 
Sizeable private production, contestability 
Financing of welfare 
services/merit goods 
Government ensures basic high quality 
supply, then private financing 
Profit-driven organizations   Fully allowed 
Government role in income 
insurance 
Provide flexicurity 
 
 